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By Sebastian Gardner 
Omri Boehm oﬀers a lucid and incisive defence, supported by careful scholarship, of the compelling idea that
preoccupation with Spinoza—appreciation of the force of Spinoza’s reasoning along with a concern to avoid his
drastic conclusions—is at the heart of Kant’s philosophical enterprise. I have learned a great deal from Boehm’s
fascinating study, and its excellence will be clearly visible to anyone who has pursued the question of what the
Critique of Pure Reason is aiming to achieve. Since a full engagement with all of the themes treated in the book
is out of the question, I am going to focus (in Sections 1 and 2) on Boehm’s treatment of the pre-Critical work in
which, he argues, Spinozism ﬁrst becomes a major issue for Kant, and then (in Section 3) say a few things about
Boehm’s general account of Kant’s confrontation with Spinoza and indicate how his conﬁguration of the Kant-
Spinoza opposition sets the stage for a later chapter in the development of classical German philosophy.
It will be helpful if I outline my diﬀerences from Boehm at the outset. Boehm launches his enquiry by arguing that
the Principle of Suﬃcient Reason (PSR) plays a key role in the argument of Kant’s early The Only Possible
Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (hereafter, Beweisgrund). Below I explain why I
am not persuaded that this is the case and why it does not seem to me that the core argument of that work—
Kant’s remarkable attempt in Section One of the Beweisgrund to prove a priori the existence of a necessary
being without assuming existence to be a predicate—renders Spinozism strictly unavoidable. This makes some
diﬀerence to Boehm’s historical narrative, insofar as Boehm presents Kant’s Critical turn as a reaction against
his own early rehearsal of Spinozism but it leaves intact Boehm’s broader thesis that Spinoza is constantly in
Kant’s sights and central to the motivation for transcendental idealism, explicit reference to Spinoza being no
measure of his importance for Kant.
Nonetheless one may have doubts about the extent to which Boehm allows Spinoza to dominate the narrative of
Kant. Is it necessary to allow as much as Boehm suggests to rest squarely on the motive of resisting Spinozism?
The tendency, which was especially noticeable in earlier anglophone Kant scholarship, to lopsidedly read Kant
as occupied merely with the shortfall of empiricism and the problems posed by Cartesian and empiricist
scepticism, certainly stood in need of correction, which recent scholarship has done a lot to provide, and
Boehm’s book is a major further contribution to a deepening appreciation of the importance of Kant’s relation to
early modern rationalism. But we do not lose anything, as far as I can see, by viewing Kant as engaged in a
complex multi-sided manoeuvre, whereby the deﬁciencies of several philosophical positions are resolved at a
single stroke—the greater the number of early modern philosophers whose diﬃculties can be exposed as
deriving from their tacit commitment to transcendental realism, the stronger the case for transcendental idealism.
Reading the Critique of Pure Reason as a critique of Spinoza should not lead us to forget that it is also and
equally a critique of Hume and Leibniz, among others.[1] Kant’s eggs are not all in one basket. Defeating
Spinozism may be the ultimate objective, which would crown the achievement of the First Critique, but its
philosophical success does not rest on that claim alone: it would be enough if its upshot were simply a
reﬁnement of the alternatives—which would accord well with the historical record, insofar as the post-Kantian
development involves a fusion of Kant and Spinoza.
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1. Kant’s Beweisgrund and the Principle of Suﬃcient Reason
Boehm interprets Section One of the Beweisgrund as revealing an ab initio commitment to the PSR. It will help to
have Boehm’s reconstruction of the argument of the Second and Third Reﬂections before our eyes (pp. 20–1):
1. Internal possibility (the essence of a thing) depends on formal and material possibility.
2. Formal possibility (the logical consistency between a concept’s predicates) depends on material possibility
(the predicates themselves).
From these deﬁnitional steps Kant continues to elaborate his argument:
3. Material possibility is grounded in something actually existing.
4. Necessarily, something is possible.
5. Necessarily, something exists. [From 3 and 4]
6. There is a being that exists necessarily.
7. There can be only one necessary being.
Boehm maintains that in order to complete this argument Kant draws tacitly on the PSR (pp. 16, 21–9). The
importance of this claim is of course that, if correct, it shows Kant to have put himself under pressure to complete
the (arguably) inexorable movement compelled by the PSR to Spinoza’s necessitarian substance monism.
Appeal to the PSR is required by Kant, according to Boehm, at four crucial points:
(i) First, in establishing the dependence of possibility on actual being  (D3). Boehm describes D3 as “plausible” in
the light of D2 but adds that it “also relies on the PSR” (p. 24). In explaining how and why the PSR comes in,
Boehm looks ahead to the First Critique and cites Kant’s statement at A308/B364 that if the conditioned is given,
then so too is the series of conditions, hence the unconditioned, and applies this PSR-like principle to the case at
hand: something must actually exist, “[o]therwise the fact that something is possible will not be ultimately
explained, which is rejected by the PSR” (p. 25). The argument is later reiterated:
[B]y the PSR, all possibilities must be grounded [in being, the context makes clear]. For if some
possibilities weren’t grounded [in being], there would be inexplicable possibilities, which is
rejected by the PSR. (p. 28)
Arguably the requirement that modal facts supervene on existents is a separate principle, independent from the
PSR. If the PSR is stated simply in the standard form of the requirement that nothing be (allowed to be thought to
be) the case without (its being thought that there is) suﬃcient reason for its being the case, i.e., simply as
answering ‘why?’ questions, then it does not of itself tell us what ontological status, if any, is to be assigned to
whatever it is that counts as suﬃcient reason. In other words, PSR in its raw unelaborated form does not tell us
what is required to qualify as a Grund and so its application to possibility does not tell us whether or not
possibility has its suﬃcient Grund in the existence of any being. Wherever our knowledge that the material
component of possibility must be “given as existing” (p. 24) might come from, it cannot be from the PSR alone.
The groundedness of possibility in actual being (D3) is logically presupposed by any ontologically signiﬁcant
employment of the PSR, not derived from it.[2]
(ii) Second, regarding the necessity that something be possible (D4), Boehm observes that the argument which
Kant gives for this proposition may seem a “trick of words” and goes on to explain how his reasoning “can also
be supported by the PSR”, even though Kant does not appeal to it (pp. 26–7). Boehm reconstructs Kant’s
argument as follows: (1) The PSR requires that “modal claims be fully explained”. (2) Absolute impossibility, if it
were a modal fact, could not be explained. Whence (3) the impossibility of absolute impossibility (D4).
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An initial problem here is that it is not clear that something of the order of absolute impossibility could be required
properly to submit itself to the PSR for “explanation”, in other words, that a proposition which deﬁnes the limiting
framework of modality can be taken as asserting a “state of aﬀairs” (p. 26). But even if it is granted that absolute
impossibility would constitute an explanation-worthy state of aﬀairs demanding application of the PSR, it may still
be held that it could satisfy the PSR in a direct reﬂexive manner: if absolute impossibility obtained, then the pure
modal fact that nothing is possible, it may be said, would suﬃciently explain why nothing is possible. To resume
the earlier point, if the notion of absolute impossibility is (so to speak) absolutely repugnant, then the proper
conclusion to draw may be simply that we are face to face here with the sheer ineliminability of possibility, in
parallel with the sheer impossibility of the truth of a formal contradiction. If so, the ineliminability of possibility
cannot be regarded as an explanandum to which the PSR may be applied, any more than the PSR can be
applied, presumably, to the necessity that there be suﬃcient reason for all that is really, extra-logically, the
case.[3] To call the ineliminability of possibility a ‘brute fact’ of a sort that the PSR precludes would be to
overshoot the mark, since if the putative ineliminability of possibility counts as a brute fact, then so too does the
putative fact of the necessity of the conformity of all real things to PSR, in which case the PSR would have to be
declared contradictory and self-refuting.
Kant’s own presentation of the case for D4, I think, suﬃces as it stands. [4] Kant’s claim, as I understand it, is that
thinking manifests immediately the reality of possibility in a way similar to that in which, according to Descartes, it
manifests the reality of a thinker, that is, without any inference (or at least, without inference from one existent to
another). If the reality of possibility is testiﬁed directly by our thinking, then no principle of thought, such as the
PSR, is needed to rule out absolute impossibility. If so, Kant’s claim in D4 is not, as Boehm puts it, that it is
analytically false or “inconsistent” to say that absolutely nothing is possible (p. 26), rather absolute impossibility
is excluded before we get to the point of being able to determine relations of logical (in)compatibility.
(iii) The PSR is required next, according to Boehm (pp. 27–32), in order to move from the  necessity that
something should exist (D5) to the existence of something that exists necessarily (D6). Again Boehm notes that
the inference may be contested, and after rejecting on textual grounds Adams’s reconstruction of Kant’s
argument, he proceeds to oﬀer a defence of it in terms of the PSR, while noting that Kant himself does not even
attempt to justify it (pp. 28–9).
Again it seems to me that the PSR is not required for the inference. It follows already, from the earlier conclusion
that possibility enjoys non-contingent reality, that whatever being makes possibility possible (D5) must be
considered, by virtue of its occupying that role, to exist necessarily (D6). Possibility-grounding actual being
cannot be thought to exist non-necessarily, for if it existed contingently, then it would be possible to remove it in
thought, to think it away, which would be for thought to cancel its own possibility. If the being which subvenes
possibility is irremovable—if its non-existence is unthinkable—then it must be thought to exist necessarily. The
inference is open to challenge insofar as it involves a movement from a necessity pertaining to thought to a
necessity pertaining to what thought identiﬁes as its ground, but it is neither obviously valid nor obviously invalid,
and I suggest that it must remain in this condition of undecidedness for as long as our general understanding of
the relation between those two species of necessity, which can be neither collapsed into one another nor
absolutely dissociated, remains incomplete.
(iv) As regards the ﬁnal move which Kant’s argument requires, to the singleness or uniqueness of the being
which exists necessarily (D7), Boehm again makes this a matter of the explanatory requirements of the PSR,
concerning, he argues, the need for the interrelations of all possibilities to possess a suﬃcient ground (p. 28).
Once again it seems to me that invocation of the PSR, which Kant gives no sign of relying on, does not help him.
Kant’s brief and dense argument in Section 3 of the Third Reﬂection (BDG, AA 2:84–5) is obscure but does at
least make it clear that it is based on the preceding discussion of the concept of absolutely necessary being, the
baseline of which is the provision of das Materiale or Data for thought (BDG, AA 2:81–3). The following
reconstruction, according to which Kant’s argument turns on the interconnection of the concept of absolutely
necessary being with that of a source of possibility, goes beyond Kant’s text but makes sense of his reasoning. If
necessary being were plural, then the question would arise, regarding each Necessary Being, whether it is
suﬃcient for the reality of possibility. If each were suﬃcient, then each individually could be thought to be
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unnecessary for the reality of possibility and so could be removed in thought, since the other Necessary Beings
that remain could be thought to bear the load. But if each in turn could be removed qua source of possibility, then
sequentially all could be removed, which contradicts D4. If the hypothesis of multiple Necessary Beings is to
avoid this consequence, then this must be either (a) because their suﬃciency for possibility results from their
conjunction, in which case they compose a single Necessary Being of which they are parts or aspects, or (b)
because there is some one Necessary Being which ensures that thought is furnished with its data, in which case
it is this guarantor of possibility which qualiﬁes as the single irremovable nothwendiges Wesen whose existence
is asserted in the ﬁnal step of the argument (D7), and whatever other Necessary Beings may be in the vicinity
fall away, as lying outside the scope of the proof. The hypothesis of a plurality of necessary beings thus resolves
itself into the hypothesis of a single Necessary Being, and once again the motor of Kant’s argument is his thesis
that there must be possibility and that it must derive from actual being. As before, it may be objected, here in
Third Paralogism style, that the argument involves an illicit movement from singleness qua source of possibility
to singleness per se, but if this does render the inference problematic, then the PSR will not restore its validity,
because the PSR does not of itself tell us how the suﬃciency of grounds is converted into the individuation of
entities.
As I have taken pains to indicate, the reconstructions that I have oﬀered of Kant’s inferences may be challenged
as regards their validity, all roughly in the same way, but they are not, I maintain, non-starters, and if I am right
that Boehm’s application of the PSR does not yield better results, then their inconclusiveness does not count
against them in the present context. What should also be stressed is that the primary question we are concerned
with here, recall, is not what argument might best deliver Kant’s conclusions but how, from the evidence, Kant
intended to argue, and what the text suggests strongly is that the nub of the Third Reﬂection is supposed to be
contained in the analysis of possibility in the Second Reﬂection. As I read Kant, he means to argue directly from
(1) the account of possibility as having a material as well as a formal component, which must be given to
thought, and given as existing, and from (2) the necessity of possibility which is implied immediately by mere
thinking, to (3) the existence of a Necessary Being; where the new principle driving his proof operates along the
dimension, not of relations between thoughts or elements within them, as do the PSR and the Principle of
Contradiction, but of (compatibility with and grounding of) the possibility of (its being true that) anything is being
thought, or that thinking can take place, at all. It is surely of high relevance that even the necessary falsity of a
contradiction (hence formal possibility too) is resolved by Kant into the exact same root.[5]
Now this construal of the argument of Section One of the Beweisgrund will ring loud bells, since its fulcrum lies in
consideration of what makes determinate thinking possible, where this refers to a type of grounding which is
neither logical in the narrow sense (formal logic establishes only ‘formal possibility’) nor a matter of worldly
causality—and exactly this is also of course the linchpin of what Kant later calls transcendental proof, which
operates on the basis of sheer possibility (now that of Erfahrung) and issues in synthetic a priori propositions. At
a ﬁner level of detail there is a parallel to be drawn between the impossibility of thinking away the material
conditions for thought asserted in the Beweisgrund, and the irremovability and consequent necessity of space
and time asserted in their metaphysical expositions in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the First Critique.[6] What
is most striking in the Beweisgrund is the obliqueness of the (elusive) necessity in thought that Kant wants to put
to work: Kant’s idea is not that we cannot think away our own existence or that of our thoughts—there is no
necessity in the existence of either of those objects—but that we cannot think away the situation of thinking’s
being possible.[7] This pure structure of thinkability is internal to thought and imposes itself on us with a
distinctive type of necessity, which in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant will try to account for immanently, but
which in the Beweisgrund is taken to reveal the immediate anchoring of thought in reality, as no mere
consideration of the agreement of concepts can do, and yet in a way which involves none of the mediation
required for a posteriori cognition. This profoundly original element does not come to light when the text is read
through Spinoza’s eyes.[8]
The notion that the Beweisgrund is genuinely distinguished from early modern rationalism with regard to its
method would seem to be testiﬁed by Jacobi’s ecstatic reception of the work recounted in his David Hume (1787)
(Jacobi 1994:284–5), and its inspiration of the seminal ideas sketched in Herder’s ‘Versuch über das Sein’
(1763).[9] That Kant would have had a very strong interest in uncovering a new a priori epistemic source
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independent of the PSR (and of the Principles of Identity and Non-Contradiction) coheres with the misgivings
about Wolﬀ’s use of the PSR that he had expressed in the New Elucidation (1755),[10] and also with the fact that,
as L.W. Beck (1969:409–10) tells us, the notion that possibility presupposes actuality “had become almost a
commonplace” by 1763. It would be puzzling if Kant intended the Beweisgrund to do no more than merely
rework a received idea.[11] If on the other hand the Beweisgrund embodies what Kant considers to be a radical
insight at a foundational level—with justiﬁcation, insofar as we can see it to contain the seed of the
Transcendental Turn—then its ambition is explained. The argumentative shortfall of the Beweisgrund, on the
view I am oﬀering, reﬂects no simple fallacy in Kant’s reasoning but derives from uncertainty at the root of the
argument concerning what exactly it means for thought to recognise that there is something which it must
conceive as having absolute but not logically necessary existence. It is reasonable to suppose that Kant’s
awareness of this limitation, which makes the argument of the Beweisgrund inconclusive—but which, to repeat,
does not mean that it is based on an outright mistake, hence does not require that it be discarded—added
impetus to the formation of the Critical concept of a transcendental ground.
2. Being and Possibility in the Beweisgrund
Disputing Boehm’s account of how Kant arrives at his conclusions in the Beweisgrund does not mean denying
the work Spinozistic signiﬁcance. The Beweisgrund creates space for Spinozism, I suggest, not because of any
implicit appeal to the PSR, but insofar as Kant’s aﬃrmation of the absolute priority of being over possibility raises
acutely the diﬃcult question of what possibility is, of how it gets into the picture seemingly in addition to being
and its determinations: a question which lays the ground for the Spinozist to argue that we should deny it any
such additional reality. Only in this weak and indirect sense, I think, can its implicit logic be described as
Spinozistic. That there is this potential for Spinozism in the Beweisgrund does not mean however that it was
actualised. Two alternative views of the Second and Third Reﬂections, one weaker and one stronger, seem to
me possible and textually warranted.
On the weaker view, the Third Reﬂection leaves undecided how exactly the grounding relation of being and
possibility should be conceived. It is surely important that Kant disavows any claim to be oﬀering in the
Beweisgrund a complete metaphysical position which would answer all of our questions concerning Reality; the
aim is only (!) to establish a proof of the existence of God. Second, Kant does not of course think that the
argument of the Third Reﬂection of the Beweisgrund suﬃces on its own as a theistic proof: it merely lays the
ground for further work, which Kant executes in the Fourth Reﬂection of Section One, where he argues that the
Necessary Being must have properties of understanding and will, and in Section Two, which re-argues this claim
on an a posteriori basis. These additionally imputed properties involve realism regarding possibility of a sort that
the Spinozist rejects, since if the Necessary Being were to exhaust Reality überhaupt and coincide with it in all
thinkable respects, then nothing would remain which could provide logical opportunity for an exercise of rational
volition displaying goodness, and ascription of that power to God would be without meaning.
Clearly, if this is Kant’s strategy, then Kant must suppose that his proof of a Necessary Being does not preclude
the realism about possibility required by theism. It may be asked how Kant can start on the business of showing
that the Necessary Being of the Third Reﬂection has additional, theistic properties without having already
established the realism about possibility which they presuppose. My answer is that Kant rightly thinks that he
does not need to come up with a refutation of the Spinozist’s modal anti-realism, but only to have left the matter
open at the end of the Third Reﬂection—that is, he assumes there is no manifestly compelling argument for anti-
realism regarding possibility. We can suppose moreover Kant to be aware that, if he is wrong about this, then
indeed a proof of the existence of any God other than Spinoza’s is impossible. But again this would mean not
that the primary task for any proof of the existence of God is to refute the Spinozist’s modal anti-realism, but that
the onus lies on the Spinozist to establish it. What makes this supposition reasonable is that it is far from obvious
that possibility cannot amount to anything more than the inherence of properties in existents: the anti-realist view
of possibility is highly revisionary—it requires nothing less than the whole complex machinery of at the very least
Book One of the Ethics—and cannot be taken oﬀ the peg. If on the other hand Kant’s reasoning in the Third
Reﬂection follows the course described by Boehm,[12] then the argument of the Beweisgrund incorporates an
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error of considerable magnitude which it is hard to account for.[13]
On the stronger view of the being-possibility relation, Kant’s position in the Beweisgrund incorporates a positive
non-Spinozistic commitment. Boehm maintains that Kant is obliged to identify possibility in general outright with
determinations of the Necessary Being, that is, with “properties” that “inhere” in it (pp. 25, 30–2, 38). Again
Boehm grants that this is not a textually explicit part of Kant’s reasoning but an interpolation, to be justiﬁed on the
basis that the only alternative is indefensible. Yet as Boehm notes (p. 25), Kant sketches not one but two
construals of the grounding of possibility:
The data of all possibility must be found in the necessary being either as determinations of it,
or as consequences which are given through the necessary being as the ultimate real ground. It
is thus apparent that all reality is, in one way or another, embraced by the ultimate real ground.
Da die Data zu aller Möglichkeiten in ihm anzutreﬀen sein müssen, entweder als
Bestimmungen desselben, oder als Folgen, die durch ihn als den ersten Realgrund gegeben
sind, so sieht man, daß alle Realität auf eine oder andere Art durch ihn begriﬀen sind. (BDG, AA
2:85; emphasis added)[14]
Boehm argues that only the ﬁrst construal makes sense, and to assert that possibilities are grounded on
Bestimmungen, according to Boehm, is to say that they just are determinations or properties of the Necessary
Being: “possibilities grounded in determinations are thus possibilities because they inhere in the existing being”
(p. 30; emphasis added). To instead ground possibility on the “consequences” (Folgen) of the Necessary Being
fails to make sense, according to Boehm, because (1) the Folgen in question would perforce be “ﬁnite beings”,
“ontologically separate” from the Necessary Being, such that (2) the net result would be to reduce Kant’s proof of
God in the Beweisgrund to the familiar cosmological argument, which cannot have been Kant’s intention (p. 31).
It is not immediately obvious what licenses the transition from “possibilities are grounded in determinations”,
which is what Kant says, to “possibilities are determinations”, nor why allowing Folgen to mediate the relation of
possibilities collapses the Beweisgrund into the old cosmological argument. [15] Why cannot Kant’s positing of
Folgen simply be an elaboration of the conclusion, already reached, that possibility is grounded in a Necessary
Being? Boehm puts a lot of weight on the allegedly problematic character of ontological separateness, and
shortly I shall say why I think this is unjustiﬁed, but I concede that the Beweisgrund is “somewhat unclear” about
the grounding relation (p. 30). Boehm’s Spinozistic clariﬁcation of Kant seems however to eliminate too much.
Though aware that this type of relation is less transparent than simple inherence (BDG, AA 2:80), what Kant
wants is without question—or so it seems to me—some kind of supervenience: Kant goes out of his way to show
that there must be slack in the relation of possibilities to their ground, and immediately after the passage quoted
above spends two pages explaining that what does not follow from his earlier argument is Boehm’s Spinozistic
reduction:
But this is not to be understood to mean that all possible reality is included among its
determinations [so ist dieses nicht so zu verstehen, daß all mögliche Realität zu seinen
Bestimmungen gehöre]. This is a conceptual confusion [eine Vermengung der Begriﬀe] which has
been uncommonly prevalent until now. (BDG, AA 2:85; emphasis added)
As Kant argues the point: Provision must be made for “real opposition” in what we ﬁnd to be the case—e.g.,
opposing forces in a physical body, or the sensation of pain—and also for negations and defects—e.g., lack of
the power of thought—for these are among the things whose possibility the Necessary Being must provide for.
This can be done only if we avoid taking such items as indices of, i.e., as licensing inference to, either (a) “logical
contradictions”, i.e., contradictory predicates, within the ground of possibility, or (b) “real opposition or positive
conﬂict among its determinations”, since this would signal defectiveness in the Necessary Being (BDG, AA
6/12
2:86). What follows according to Kant is that (i) not all “possible reality” is “included among” the determinations of
the Necessary Being, (ii) certain realities do not exist in the Necessary Being as determinations thereof (“so
können sie nicht insgesammt als Prädicate in ihm sein”), and (iii) certain negative states of aﬀairs or defects
“depend upon” and are “grounded in” the Necessary Being, with respect to “what is real in them”, yet are not
predicable of it (BDG, AA 2:86–7). The key notion therefore is that these other realities are given through the
Necessary Being (“weil sie doch alle durch ihn gegeben sind”), and as such belong to it in some either direct or
indirect sense (“so werden sie entweder zu seinen Bestimmungen oder Folgen gehören”), but are not given as
in it in the same manner as its properties.[16]
That Kant would ﬁnd it natural to posit an intermediate realm between God as the Necessary Being, and the
ﬁnite worldly objects of our immediate cognition, is surely plausible in light of the Leibnizian-Wolﬃan
background.[17] As Boehm notes (p. 35), the primary example Kant gives of something which must be assumed
in order to provide thought with its data but whose possibility cannot be further analysed, is extension (BDG, AA
2:80–1). In the language of Wolﬀ and Baumgarten, and contemporaries of Kant’s such as Lambert and
Mendelssohn, extension is a Realität, a notion employed freely in the Beweisgrund.[18] The sense in which
Realitäten such as extension, which cannot be ascribed to God, are consequently ‘ontologically separate’ is a
relatively ﬁne matter: they are at any rate not separate in the manner of objects, such as material bodies, that
can exhibit real opposition. From the evidence, as far as I can see, Kant in 1763 had no compelling basis for
thinking Realitäten incoherent and did not feel the pressure of the issue of ontological separateness highlighted
by Boehm, decisive though it may be for the argument between Leibniz and Spinoza.[19]
One important consideration advanced by Boehm is that Kant later describes the implications of the argument of
Reﬂection Three of the Beweisgrund as Spinozistic. I suggest this has a straightforward interpretation consistent
with what I have proposed. On the weaker of the two views I described, Kant has no full positive theory in the
Beweisgrund of how possibility can supervene on, without being reducible to, actual being, and Boehm is exactly
right that it is here that the Spinozist does well to apply pressure. Nevertheless and not unreasonably, I argued,
Kant in the Beweisgrund supposes that the picture that he requires is intelligible and well motivated. This is what
changes in the Critical period, where Kant has given up on the idea that gaps in ‘dogmatic’ metaphysics can be
ﬁlled by positive theorising, and has transferred its burden to the practical domain, so there is no longer reason
to maintain the thinkability of alternatives to Spinozism. And canvassing Spinozism as the sole alternative to
transcendental idealism—raising the stakes and writing the Leibnizian-Wolﬃan compromise, as Kant wants it to
appear after 1781, out of the picture—makes the Kantian option harder to decline: which is Kant’s explicit
strategy in the Second Critique. The stronger view of the possibility-being relation can therefore also be
abandoned in the Critical philosophy.
A similar kind of explanation can be given for the fact that Kant recapitulates the reasoning of the Second and
Third Reﬂections of Section One of the Beweisgrund in the Transcendental Ideal of the First Critique. It is
essential for Kant’s general strategy in dealing with transcendent metaphysics that an Idea of Reason be located
at the root of the concept of God, in order for it not to be an arbitrary construction, and the line of reasoning which
he had developed earlier in the Beweisgrund—and which on my reading rests on extrapolation from the fact of
ﬁnding oneself in the bare situation of being a thinker of would-be determinate truths—supplies Kant with what
he needs: Kant is able to claim that we are led from determinate thought to the Idea of an ens realissimum, in the
same way that we are led from experience in general to the Idea of a transcendentally free cause. Just as
Boehm reads the Beweisgrund as actual Spinozism, while I read it as at most opening the door to it, Boehm
sees the Transcendental Ideal as rehearsing Spinozistic reasoning speciﬁcally in order to disempower it, while I
interpret Kant in this part of the Critique as revisiting his earlier argumentation, conserving the part of it that he
continues to regard as cogent, viz., the Gedankengang that leads from thought to the Idea of a ground of all
thinkable possibility, while denying its conclusion the ‘dogmatic’ status that he accorded it in 1763; such that,
while of course the Transcendental Ideal in the full context of the Dialectic has critical force vis-à-vis Spinoza,
this is only one aspect of it.
3. Kant vs./& Spinoza
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The foregoing relates to Boehm’s claim that Spinozism is, so to speak, internal to Kant and by abreaction a
driver of the Critical project. The discussion which occupies the other main chapters of Boehm’s book, and which
largely stands independently of the claims of Chapter One, is devoted to the question of how the Critical Kant
means to deal with Spinoza and with what degree of success.
Boehm refers to the illuminating discussion by Fisher and Watkins (1998) of the relation of the Beweisgrund to
the Ideal of Pure Reason (p. 50). Fisher and Watkins emphasise the diﬃculty of locating Kant’s justiﬁcation for
denying constitutive status to the ens realissimum, and suggest that it has to do with Kant’s account of reason
and the understanding, while making it clear that this does not by any means render Kant’s argument irresistible.
Boehm’s own solution—namely, that the theory of transcendental illusion is what undercuts the security of the
inference to D6, warranting the conversion of Spinozism into merely regulative doctrine—is similarly indirect and
tentative: Boehm grants that it remains a “vexing question” whether the theory of transcendental illusion is
suﬃcient to deﬂect Spinozism (p. 58) and accordingly moves the discussion on to the Antinomy of Pure Reason,
where he considers that Kant’s more compelling criticisms of Spinoza are to be found.
A general question may be raised concerning Boehm’s strategy of allowing the Antinomy of Pure Reason to play
the lead role in Kant’s endeavour to refute Spinoza. It is worth pointing out that in Kant’s head-on confrontation
with Spinoza in the Second Critique (where, Kant tells us, we come to see the full importance of the critique of
speculative reason), Kant refers to time’s ideality qua “mere form of sensible intuition”, i.e., to the grounds for
idealism presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and not to the contradictions of rational cosmology (see
KpV, AA 5:100–3). Kant’s accent here is not on any inherent defect in the notion that time is a fundamental
determination of reality, but on the independence of the temporal way of representing things from whatever
determinations they receive from the “original being”, and this is a positive claim about time which requires the
positive epistemology of the Aesthetic, not a direct consequence of the negative argument of the Antinomy.
As regards the crunch question of how far Kant actually gets in his endeavour to undermine Spinoza, Boehm’s
answer is aﬃrmative: he concludes that the rationalist conviction that the world must be explicable through and
through, which makes necessitarianism unavoidable and collapses Ought into Is, should yield to the anti-
necessitarian demands of morality (speciﬁcally, of “moral outrage”), for the Kantian reason that Spinoza’s project
has been shown to rest on a “normative decree rather than on theoretical justiﬁcation”, a decree which is itself
practically motivated and thus answerable to the demands of freedom (pp. 182–5). (This is a very bare statement
of Boehm’s conclusion as it emerges from his subtle discussion of the ontological argument in Chapter Four. His
full account involves also a highly interesting discussion in Chapter Two of the Spinozist’s right to the notion of an
actual inﬁnite, in which the sublime makes an unexpected appearance.)
Here however is one ground for worry. When Kant explains the value of the theory of non-temporal noumenal
agency in the passage from the Second Critique referred to above, his claim is that we can we lay claim to real
authorship of (and control over) our actions only if we suppose the temporal realm to be excluded from the scope
of divine determination (God’s creation). The transcendental ideality of time is thus what grants us the
ontological separateness, the scope to posit an Ought independently from an Is, that Spinoza denies us, and
which, Kant aﬃrms, Spinoza rightly regards as impossible in a realm of things in themselves, which we are
obliged to conceive as deriving from and as fully determined by a single original being. The result of this
manoeuvre is however, as several of Kant’s contemporaries quickly noted, highly paradoxical: Kant de-realises
our agency as we sensibly cognise it, in order to relocate it, or rather its true ground, in the noumenal sphere,
where, Kant asserts, absolute determination prevails. If this is right, Kant appears to have analysed the
transcendental freedom required by pure practical reason into a mere appearance of contingency behind which
lies a reality of intelligible fatalism. Either that, or our actions qua sensible are God-independent—whence the
possibility of our true authorship—but not therefore ‘mere appearance’ in contrast with (a substrate of) things in
themselves, and transcendental idealism is not the doctrine that it seemed to be; it now appears unnervingly
close to what Fichte will shortly declare its real meaning to consist in.
Whether this aﬀects Boehm’s account depends upon how much of a positive constructive alternative, on his
view, Kant needs to come up with in order to counter Spinozism. But some challenge has emerged. The
expectation was that Kant’s repudiation of the necessitarian PSR would be accompanied by a coherent
alternative theoretical picture, but if the worry just expressed is correct, this is doubtful. The Spinozist would do
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well at this point to refer back to the Beweisgrund and ask how matters are supposed to have been improved. In
Section Two of that work Kant attempted, hastily and rather desperately, to make provision for “actions which
issue from freedom”, by postulating “an inadequately understood contingency” and “an indeterminacy in respect
of determining grounds” (BDG, AA 2:110). The Spinozist may reasonably ask whether the Critical philosophy
oﬀers anything superior which would begin to cover the costs of renouncing the PSR.
If reclassifying the results of the exercise of pure reason as regulative does not strip them of their ‘dogmatic’
ontological force, and if transcendental idealism does not reconcile theoretical and practical reason, then more
must be going on in pure reason than Kant has yet brought to light and a new attempt to reconcile freedom and
reason must be made. Following this lead, let me ﬁnish by jumping ahead many decades. Boehm’s book is of
course not a study of the post-Kantian development, and in claiming Schelling’s relevance here I just mean to
indicate how the Kant-Spinoza opposition to which Boehm gives sharp deﬁnition supplies, historically and
systematically, a basis for further philosophical development.
There is extraordinary continuity of Kant’s 1763 Beweisgrund with what is, chronologically speaking, the very last
word in the development of classical German philosophy. Schelling is well known for the overtly Spinozistic
system that he espoused between roughly 1801 and 1804, from which Hegel branches oﬀ, but his Philosophy of
Identity, as he calls it, represents just one of Schelling’s several attempts to consummate his philosophical
insights in a wissenschaftliche form, and if taken in isolation it occludes the profound problematic that really
occupied Schelling from the beginning to the end of his philosophical career and which becomes fully clear only
in his writings from the Weltalter period (c. 1811) onwards. This late philosophy can be viewed, I suggest, as an
extended meditation on the insight that leads Kant to think that his modiﬁcation of rationalism in the Beweisgrund
opens a new door which puts the ultimately desired object of human reason within its grasp.
Schelling’s late view may be reconstructed as follows. There is a limit point at which philosophical reﬂection ﬁnds
itself poised exactly between Spinoza and Kant, pointed simultaneously in both of their directions: that of
supposing pure reason to have its own absolute content, reﬂective elaboration of which can encompass all
actual and possible reality, inclusive of reﬂection itself; and that of acknowledging its own dependence on a Prius
that it cannot retrieve or make transparent, a necessity which cannot be reduced to any logical relation. The
former yields the necessitarian PSR of Spinoza, and returns (in a semi-degenerate form) in Hegel. The latter,
guided by the intention of preserving contingency and freedom, is expressed in Kant’s assertion of the
dependence of determinate truth on the independent contribution of sensible intuition—the equivalent in
transcendental philosophy of the Data zu aller Möglichkeit in the Beweisgrund.
Now the problem, as Schelling sees it, is that neither can be repudiated. The necessity of the a priori has been
demonstrated by the Critical philosophy, but Hegelianism exhibits the total emptiness that results ultimately from
the endeavour to extract reality per se from pure reason. Recognition of the Hegelian terminus leaves us
confronted with (in Schelling’s new idiom) the Fact of the World at the root of thought, and in eﬀect takes us back
to the situation of the pre-Critical Kant, caught between the claims of empiricism and rationalism (whose history
Schelling’s 1830s texts go over repeatedly). Schelling is therefore recovering, and for the ﬁrst time making
adequately clear, the insight of the Beweisgrund that reﬂection on the possibility of thought leads to a point where
we so to speak pass over into transcendental reality: If I am to think—and I do think!—then there must be
possibility, and in order for there to be possibility, there must be some being which pre-dates thought and
possibility, and hence which also pre-dates the PSR. The necessity which manifests itself at this point does not
allow for a distinction to be drawn between the necessity that p (where modality is ascribed to the content of
thought) and the necessity of thinking that p (where modality attaches to the thinking of the content). The PSR is
thereby shown to be, in a newly disclosed sense, non-necessary, though it is also—and on the condition of
being so understood—absolutely valid.
The highly complex structures that Schelling develops in his late philosophy are attempts to square Kant and
Spinoza, not of course with respect to the letter of their writings, but with respect to their underlying philosophical
dynamics. In what is virtually his last text, ‘Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten’ (1850; see
esp. SW, XI:585–90/1990:64–7), Schelling identiﬁes the summit of previous reﬂection on the problem of
necessary truth with Kant’s Ideal of Pure Reason, from careful consideration of which, he tries to show, the
project of his own Positive Philosophy can be extracted. What Schelling might have added, if what I said earlier
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is correct, is that behind the Ideal lies the Beweisgrund, which stands on the cusp of grasping what Schelling
calls unvordenklichen Seyn, insofar as Kant there recognises a necessity within thought which is more primitive
than the PSR or Principles of Contradiction and Identity, but which, on Schelling’s diagnosis, a compelling
(dialectical) illusion leads us to suppose manifests pure rational necessity. Schelling’s movement forward from
Kant is to that extent also a return to an idea which Kant had glimpsed but left behind.
Invited: 24 October 2014; received: 10 August 2016.
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Notes:
[1] The point is made in Anthony Bruno’s review of Boehm, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 11 November 2014.↩
[2] Relevant here is Schopenhauer’s treatment of the PSR in The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Suﬃcient Reason.↩
[3] Matters may be more complicated insofar as, arguably, reﬂexive applications of the PSR result in distinct, further modal truths
and do not consist merely in diﬀerent ways of stating the principle itself. But even granting this baroque ontology, it makes no
diﬀerence to the point at hand, which is simply that, if the PSR can loop back on itself in a self-vindicatory manner, then so too
can ‘Necessarily there is possibility’.↩
[4] More precisely, we could not be thinking in any sense that allows our thoughts to be candidates for truth: we could be ‘thinking’
only in the sense of executing purely formal, merely syntactic operations. In other words, Kant’s argument requires that our
thinking be truth-directed (but not that any of our thoughts be true).↩
[5] “If we now consider for a moment why that which contradicts itself should be absolutely nothing and impossible, I ﬁnd that
through the cancellation [Aufhebung] of the law of contradiction, the ultimate logical ground of all that can be thought, all
possibility vanishes, and there is nothing left to think [nichts dabei mehr zu denken sei]” (BDG, AA 2:82). In this paragraph Kant
sets formal and material possibility in parallel and identiﬁes the requirement that there be something zu Denken as the crux of
both.↩
[6] Boehm notes the parallel at p. 61 n.18, but does not pursue it. Also worth noting as an anticipation of things to come is the
argument at BDG AA 2:112, that “the commonly held concept of natural things, according to which their internal possibility is
independent and without any external ground”—a.k.a. transcendental realism!—would make order in nature as good as
miraculous, i.e., intrinsically unintelligible.↩
[7] Elucidation of these claims, and support for them, can be found in Kant’s discussion of the concept of existence in Section
One, where Kant asserts both its unanalysability and its equivalence with the concept of “absolute position” or “absolute positing”
(BDG, AA 2:70–6).↩
[8] The interpretation of the Beweisgrund sketched here diﬀers also from those of other recent commentators, including Robert
Adams, Andrew Chignell, Nicholas Stang and Peter Yong, but I shall not explore the diﬀerences here.↩
[9] The proto-transcendental character of the Beweisgrund is noted in Cassirer (1981:65).↩
[10] It is to be noted that at the end of the work, Kant distances himself from reliance on the PSR and also, signiﬁcantly, endorses
it only qua causal principle proceeding from an existentially committed premise (Section Three, BDG, AA 2:157–9).↩
[11] Or, for that matter, to merely repeat what he had said in Proposition VII of the New Elucidation. If we compare the two texts,
the methodological advance is quite clear: the earlier text describes its proof as “based on essence” and as concerned with “the
possibility itself of things”, not with the provision of data of thought (PND, AA 1:395).↩
[12] Boehm ﬁrst says that Kant “was aware of” his commitment to substance monism (p. 7) but later qualiﬁes the attribution (pp.
44–5) and ﬁnally suggests that “we should care less about Kant’s conscious commitments in 1763” (p. 45). This risks moving his
account of the Beweisgrund out of the category of historical exegesis and into that of pure rational reconstruction.↩
[13] That Kant exhibits hesitation in this continuation of his argument, as Boehm rightly notes (pp. 42–3), is not probative: Kant
may not think that the Necessary Being is ‘easily’ considered a person, but he cannot suppose the notion to have been ruled
out.↩
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[14] And note that “all reality is, in one way or another [auf eine oder andere Art], embraced by the ultimate real ground” (BDG,
AA 2:87; emphasis added).↩
[15] Two further considerations advanced by Boehm in support of his account (p. 32) should be mentioned: Kant’s use of “enthält”
to describe the relation of the Necessary Being to what it grounds, and his assertion in the First Critique that the ens realissimum
comprehends (“in sich begreift”) all predicates not merely “under” but “within” itself (A577/B605). Regarding the ﬁrst, it is notable
that when Kant talks of enthalten, its object is, as far as I can see, not “all possibility”, as Boehm implies, but rather “den letzten
Realgrund” thereof (BDG, AA 2:83, 84–5) or “die höchste Realität” (BDG, AA 2:85). Regarding the second point, it seems
doubtful, as I say below, that the back-inference can be safely made, since in the Critical period Kant’s relation to Spinoza has
changed.↩
[16] Understanding and will, by contrast, are true (wahre) realities (BDG, AA 2:87), and not Folgen but Bestimmungen of the
Necessary Ground (BDG, AA 2:89).↩
[17] Indicative of Kant’s readiness to tolerate an intermediary in the grounding relation is his intermittent suggestion in the Third
Reﬂection of a (conceptual or formal, but certainly not real) distinction between (a) the Necessary Being as such, and (b) “the
ultimate real ground” (ersten Realgrund or letzten Realgrund) of possibility. As I emphasised earlier, Kant regards the latter as
identical with the ﬁrst—the Necessary Being must be considered “as” (als) the letzten Realgrund, for it is as such that we come to
cognise it—but this does not make their concepts identical. Thus in the passage from BDG, AA 2:85 quoted above, Kant seems
to be saying that what is “given as” (gegeben als) “the ﬁrst real ground” (den ersten Realgrund) is not the Necessary Being itself
but rather its (or perhaps just some of its) determinations and consequences. Also notable and of relevance here is Kant’s use of
Realität as interchangeable with possibility in general at the beginning of the Fourth Reﬂection (BDG, AA 2:87).↩
[18] And that he had employed earlier in the New Elucidation, AA 1:395–6.↩
[19] Boehm writes: “Every contemporary of Kant’s would have to wonder how, or whether, Kant intends to evade the conclusion
that extension just is a divine attribute” (p. 36). I agree that the question ought to have suggested itself but doubt that it did so in
an urgent form, in view of the facility with which the notion of a Realität circulated. That said, the review which appeared in Briefe,
die neueste Literatur betreﬀend in 1764 supports Boehm—but only insofar as the reviewer thinks that the a priori argument is
pointless, since what does theistic work is the a posteriori argument of Section Two. That Kant in fact did not intend the
Spinozistic conclusion, on the other hand, seems unquestionable, in view of Kant’s assertion that extension cannot be an attribute
of that which has will and understanding (BDG, AA 2:85).↩
References:
Beck, L.W. (1969), Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors (Bristol: Thoemmes Press).
Cassirer, E. (1981), Kant’s Life and Thought, trans. James Haden (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Fisher, M. and E. Watkins (1998), ‘Kant on the Material Ground of Possibility: From ”The Only Possible
Argument” to the Critique of Pure Reason‘, Review of Metaphysics 52(2): 369–95.
Jacobi, F.H. (1994), The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel ‘Allwill’, trans. and ed. G. di Giovanni
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press).
Schelling, F.W.J. (1856–61), ‘Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten’, in Sämmtliche Werke (SW),
ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta), vol. XI, pp. 573–90.
——— (1990), ‘On the Source of the Eternal Truths’, trans. Edward A. Beach, in Owl of Minerva 22(1) (1990):
55–67.
♕
© Sebastian Gardner, 2016.
Sebastian Gardner is Professor of Philosophy at UCL in London, UK. His work concentrates on Kant and post-
Kantian philosophy. He has published widely on Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Sartre,
11/12
Merleau-Ponty and the aesthetic turn in post-Kantianism. Among his books are Kant and the Critique of Pure
Reason (Routledge 1999), Sartre’s “Being and Nothingness” (Continuum/Bloomsbury, 2009) and, together
with Matthew Grist, The Transcendental Turn (Oxford UP 2015). He is currently working on a book on the
legacy of Kant’s Third Critique.
website
12/12
